Lowe says No: M 's efficacy is invisible. 7 Crucial is that Closure is not violated, so that anyone empirically tracking the causal history of B will find a sufficient physical cause at 5 Here time is discrete, a simplifying (but not essential) aspect of the model. 6 "While this is not to say that there is no kind of empirical evidence that could have a bearing on this debate, the implication would seem to be that purely metaphysical arguments must have a larger role to play than is commonly supposed in determining which of [interactive dualism or one of its physicalist rivals] is superior" (Lowe 2008, 58) . 7 Note that the question here and below is not whether M itself is visible (Lowe 2003, 151) . Presumably there are any number of methods, both first-person and third-person, to detect the presence of a mental property. The question is whether M 's efficacy-and in particular, its efficacy with respect to B-is visible to empirical investigators. } t 1 , and so will see no reason to postulate a non-physical cause-this in spite of the fact that a non-physical cause is required for B.
Note that there's not going to be a way to test for M 's non-redundant efficacy by removing the mental state (by, say, distracting the subject or rendering him unconscious) while holding P fixed. From our God's-eye view, we see that the counternomic conditional mentioned earlier is true, but our hypothetical scientists can't see this,
at least not in the way envisaged. Any removal of M would also involve tampering with P, thus altering B 's physical causal history. It will continue to appear as if P is doing all of the work.
By the way, it's important for Lowe's purposes that P 's causation of M be simultaneous. To see this, suppose for a moment that t 1 and t 2 are not adjacent times, but that there is some time between them, and that P causes M to be instantiated, not at t 1 , but at this intermediate time. On the powers account of causation, power y 's being a manifestation of powers x 1 …x n (equivalently, x 1 …x n 's producing y) is taken as an undefined primitive, 9 but one of its important features can be mentioned here: If y is a manifestation of x 1 …x n , then
x 1 …x n are complete in the sense that no other power needs to be partnered with them to produce y. It is in this sense that x 1 …x n are causally sufficient for y, and it's this productive sense of causal sufficiency, not the nomic sense, that, it seems to me, should appear in Closure. (Another reason causal sufficiency here is not nomic necessitation is that it's usually possible that the complete set be present, but that some other power be on the scene to prevent the manifestation (see Anjum and Mumford 2010) . One may be tempted to say in that case that the original set isn't complete after all: the absence of the preventing power must be present as well. But the absence of a power isn't a power, any more than the absence of a chair is a chair.)
Return then to Closure, which currently reads:
Closure: Everything physical that has a cause at time t has a sufficient physical cause at t.
We could stay with this, so long as "sufficient physical cause" is understood in terms of causal production (manifestation), as above. But just to make this feature explicit, I
propose reformulating Closure as:
Closure (reformulated): Every physical manifestation is produced by physical powers.
A few notes on this new version:
First, it allows the principle to be a bit more compact. Since manifestations are by definition caused, "every physical manifestation that has a cause" would be redundant. And we no longer need to refer to times, since producing powers always immediately precede their manifestations. Any would-be production that was temporally mediated would not be complete, as the intermediate power(s) would have to be added to produce the manifestation.
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Second, this modified principle, like its predecessor, is not so strong as to preclude a role for non-physical powers in producing physical manifestations. For all Closure tells us, a given physical manifestation might be produced by physical powers and by non-physical powers (or by some combination of the two). Closure requires merely that every physical manifestation is produced at least by physical powers, whether or not it happens to be produced (that is, over-produced) by other sorts of powers as well.
Third, this rephrasing has the virtue of explaining why Lowe's model is, as it should be, a violation of Closure, for B on Lowe's model is not produced by P, since P, although complete for M, is not complete for B. Rather, B is produced by the partnering of P and M. Furthermore, the invisibility claim starts to look suspect in a way that it might not have on the nomic understanding of causal sufficiency. After all, if P doesn't produce B, shouldn't this be detectable? With respect to producing B, P should look as odd as a gear with some missing teeth that nevertheless smoothly turns another gear. This is in fact what I will propose, though getting there will require a closer look at the way powers combine to produce their manifestations.
IV. Principles of combination
Thesis (2) of emergentism, when elaborated, says that mental properties emerge only in physical systems of a certain degree of complexity. This means M emerges from a complex combination of physical powers, so that P is really a structural property composed of properties of the system's physical parts (and, perhaps, properties of the immediate environment). Call these the "micro-powers" composing P.
Now I assume that these micro-powers can be studied individually in non-mental contexts-that is, when they do not compose P or any other psychological base, so that the meddling of non-physical powers is not in question. Such a study will let us construct an increasingly detailed causal profile for each micro-power, one that specifies the contribution the power makes when a partner in purely physical production. 11 The general strategy is then unsurprising: predict, based on these empirically discovered causal profiles, how the micro-powers will partner in the mental context. If B is what's predicted by their profiles, we have evidence that they are the powers producing this behavior. If not-if B is anomalous with respect to these profiles-we have evidence for the contribution of a non-physical power, and M 's efficacy is no longer hidden.
But exposing M 's role cannot be this simple. The worry here is not inductive skepticism about causal profiles. (If skepticism were in play, Lowe's invisibility claim would be more secure, but less interesting, perhaps trivial.) The worry, rather, is that the causal profiles gained from non-mental contexts aren't useful for this project without some principle of combination saying how micro-powers with these profiles combine when partnered in a new (in this case, mental) context. I doubt such a principle can be known a priori.
But can't it be known empirically? Take a simple case for illustration. Suppose we determine that a solid object shaped like "|" produces an "|" shape when pressed into soft clay, while one shaped like "<" produces a "<" shape. These are (partial) causal profiles for each of these shapes, themselves powers. A principle of combination could tell us that when these two shapes are arranged in the form of a "K", they will produce a "K" shape in soft clay. I will not attempt to precisely formulate the relevant principle here, but it will roughly be an "additive" principle:
Additivity: Powers in combination produce the sum of the manifestations they produce independently. In any case, suppose Additivity is confirmed in non-mental contexts. Armed with the causal profiles of our micro-powers, can't we then predict, when they compose P, what their additive result should be? If something besides B is predicted, then when B does occur, we have evidence of a non-physical power at work. 13 Note that the epistemic bar here is low. Empirical evidence for some conclusion needn't be infallible, and inductive skepticism is set to one side. We just need good empirical reasons for thinking that a non-physical property is efficacious, at it looks as if this fits the bill.
Additivity is not the only candidate principle of combination. Another is:
Continuity: Similar powers in combination with similar partners produce proportionally similar manifestations.
Suppose that by studying physical powers in non-mental contexts, we can place them along one or more dimensions of similarity, so that the closer two powers are along a dimension, the more similar they are causally. From these similarity orderings, use
Continuity to predict how our micro-powers will combine when they compose P, expecting that their joint manifestation will be proportionally similar to the manifestations that their close relatives produce in a similar (but non-mental) combination. Again, if the manifestation B does not meet this expectation, this is evidence for the presence of another power on the scene, which would need to be nonphysical.
I take it that Continuity is at work for some of those emergentists who, unlike Lowe, think emergent causation must be detectable. Mental properties emerge only when physical systems have reached a certain threshold of complexity. Once this threshold is reached, radically discontinuous effects are observed, effects that cannot be accounted for by the continuous operation of physical causal powers. Such a violation of Continuity, that is, would be evidence for an emergent.
V. The micro-latency hypothesis and intelligibility
The upshot so far is that the efficacy of M in Lowe's model will not be invisible so long as the manifestation B is not what we would predict from the micro-powers composing P and the governing principle of combination, all of which can be discovered empirically. (In defense of this hypothesis, I should also note that it needn't say the micropowers composing P are transformed into different powers-pace O'Connor (2000, 113-4) who, unlike Lowe, is a "visible" emergentist. As O'Connor reads the micro-latency hypothesis, it requires that the micro-powers composing P are locally responsive to their macro-level circumstances. He then objects that it's mysterious how a power's nature could be affected non-locally, according to the broader structure of which it is a part.
How does a micro-power "know" that it's now included in such a larger, mental structure? But it seems to me that the hypothesis doesn't have to be understood this way. The micro-powers composing P don't know that they are in a mental context. They keep the natures they had outside this context: they continue to "do what they're doing". It's just that they combine in novel ways in these new circumstances. Imagine two bowling balls, each giving a reading of 15 on a scale. With both on the scale, we get a reading, not of 30, but 40. The latency hypothesis in this case needn't say that the bowling balls know they are in a "paired" structure, and, thus informed, acquire new weights. Rather, they continue to weigh 15 pounds each-it's just that their weights do not combine additively. The micro-latency hypothesis the same sort of thing is going on when P produces the anomalous result B. The micro-powers composing P don't change because they are in a mental context. Rather, in this context, they compose in novel ways.)
If the micro-latency hypothesis is always available as a (non-skeptical) alternative to emergentism, Lowe's invisibility claim would seem to be vindicated. But continuing to press, could it turn out that there is a principle of combination whose violation could not be explained by this hypothesis? Suppose we were to empirically confirm a metaprinciple of combination, one that governs the way powers combine no matter what first-order principle (Additivity, Continuity, or whatnot) they obey in any particular situation. If powers are observed to combine in various first-order ways in non-mental contexts, we might be able to discern such a meta-principle.
What could a meta-principle look like? Here's one idea:
Intelligibility: Powers are manifested intelligibly.
As a first pass, think of intelligibility like this: when powers are manifested, we can see that the powers and manifestation fit together, much like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.
Knowing (by prior inspection) how the pieces are shaped, we can see that they should interlock. Similarly, knowing (empirically) the causal profiles of various powers, we can see how they and their manifestations fit together.
Suppose, then, that we have evidence from non-mental contexts for Intelligibility across a variety of first-order principles of combination, and suppose that the micropowers composing P are not manifested intelligibly by B in the mental context. That is, empirical investigators can't see how P and B fit together. This looks like good evidence for a non-physical power partnering with P to produce B. Now suppose the defender of invisibility tries make the latency move: for all our scientists know, the anomalous manifestation B is a result, not of a non-physical power partnering with P, It's this last bit of insight that Sanford calls "intelligibility".
Second, Intelligibility as formulated is actually stronger than we need to answer Lowe. I've been speaking of "micro-powers", but a structural property such as P can be broken down into properties at various mereological levels. For simplicity, suppose there are two such levels: the level of basic physics (the micro-level), and above it the level of neuroscience. I take that each level has its characteristic properties (powers). Now
Intelligibility as formulated requires that powers manifest intelligibly at each level, but this is stronger than we need. Suppose it turns out that powers don't manifest intelligibly at the level of basic physics. Perhaps it just looks brute that, for example, like charges repel. It's compatible with this that neuroscientific powers do manifest intelligibly. 14 (Returning to the puzzle analogy, it would be a bit like discovering that a puzzle is ultimately composed of tiny, colored pixels. Why one pixel should be next to another may look brute. But given that pixels are arranged to form certain shapes at higher mereological levels, their subsequent ability to interlock is intelligible.) So if we were to discover that this more limited principle of "Neuro-Intelligibility" holds, we could use it to look at what P produces in the mental context. If B is an unintelligible result at the neuroscientific level, this again is evidence for the efficacy of an emergent, evidence
that cannot be explained away with the micro-latency hypothesis.
The principle of Intelligibility is very ambitious and so may obscure my aim here, which is modest: find some way, at least in principle, to force M 's efficacy to reveal itself on Lowe's model of mental causation. Empirical confirmation of Intelligibility (or its weaker cousin) looks like it would be enough. If this is right, then it has a lesson for those bold emergentists who take their view to make empirical predictions: they should hope for confirmation of Intelligibility or some similar meta-principle of combination.
Otherwise, the debate between physicalists and emergentists may remain with philosophy, and there the evidence is that the debate is likely to remain unresolved. 
